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Abstract: 
 
This paper focuses on the post-war process of creation of a global trading system and 
integration of world trade. As the former came into being, multilateral trade liberalization 
became an on-going feature of the global economy facilitating international trade, 
consequently importance of international trade in the global economy increased dramatically. 
Since the mid-1980s, mindset of policy makers in the developing economies regarding trade 
policy began changing in a discernible manner. The high- and middle-income developing 
economies liberalized their trade policy regimes and tried to integrate with the global 
economy. Several developing economies were highly successful in integrating with the global 
economy through trade. The change in the mindset of policy mandarins was clearly visible 
during the Uruguay Round and the on-going Doha Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Although the industrial economies were the primary beneficiaries of the multilateral trade 
liberalization in the past, for the developing economies trade, particularly trade in 
manufacturing goods, went on increasing monotonically. The kaleidoscope of global trading 
system turned several times and international trade has enormously expanded over the 
preceding half century, which in turn contributed substantially to global integration through 
trade, albeit in a selective manner. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The kaleidoscope of global trading system turned several times and international trade has 
enormously expanded over the preceding half century, which in turn contributed substantially 
to global integration through trade, albeit in a selective manner. The first focus of this paper 
is the liberalization and globalization of trading system. The second focus is the changing 
pattern of world trade and its growing integration. Some trade analysts have drawn attention 
to the “interesting riddle in international macroeconomics”, that is, despite advances in 
technology and lowering of trade barriers, there is little empirical evidence of globalization in 
trade. Large empirical literature in international macroeconomics that uses gravity model 
concluded that there is no evidence of contemporary wave of globalization leading to a 
decline in the cost of trade over time. However, the stable distance coefficient could be 
explained by a continual transformation in the pattern of global trade. Besides, several 
empirical exercises found clear evidence of globalization in world trade as well as evidence 
of declining significance of geography. Their estimates clearly indicated a declining 
importance of geography, which stood for a spurt in globalization for the decade of the 
1990s. The diminishing importance of geography is logically consistent with the phenomenon 
of expanding globalization.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 focuses on the global trading system, while 
Section 3 on the trends in liberalization of trade policy. Changing trade patterns and growing 
integration of world trade has been elaborated upon in Section 4. In Section 5, which is a 
large section, I try to establish the trade and globalization nexus. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Evolving Global Trading System2 
 
At the end of the Second World War, interest, enthusiasm and commitment to trade 
liberalization was exceedingly high among the major trading economies of the world. In 
1946, even before the International Trade Organization (ITO) charter3 was approved, 23 of 
                                                           
2 Multilateral trading system is technically a more correct expression than global trading system because not all 
the countries are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In March 2003, its membership was 144 
countries, which included almost all the principal trading nations. In addition, 32 countries had observer status. 
This category included the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.  
3 The ITO Charter was ambitious and extended beyond the world trade disciplines. It included regulations on 
employment, commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, international investment and trade in 
services. Although the ITO Charter was finally agreed at a United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment in Havana in March 1948, ratification in some national legislatures proved impossible. The most 
 5
the 50 participants of the Bretton Woods conference decided to launch negotiations with an 
objective to reduce tariffs and bind them.4 These economies were eager to give an impetus to 
trade liberalization and to “begin correcting the legacy of protectionist measures” which were 
in place since the early 1930s.  
 
An attempt was made to create an ITO under the Havana Charter, which was negotiated in 
1947.5 It was intended that the ITO would join hands with the two Bretton Woods 
institutions. All the countries that signed the Havana Charter did not ratify the creation of the 
ITO as a supranational organization. The United States (US) Congress had strong 
reservations against several Articles of Agreement of the ITO. It was perceived by the US 
Congress as an organization having too many teeth. It was also felt that the ITO’s authority 
was spilling beyond international trade. As the ITO was stillborn, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in its place. The Protocol was signed on 30 October 
1947 and the GATT entered into force on 1 January 1948. The Protocol of Provisional 
Application of the GATT was signed by 23 countries. These original "Contracting Parties" 
(or CPs) were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, the 
Czechoslovak Republic, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America.6 The GATT expanded with the passage of time and continued to 
exist and function as a residual organization. 7 It became the only multilateral instrument 
governing international trade, performed its duties between 1948 and 1994.8 It was created as 
a specialized agency of the United Nations and provided the rules for much of the global 
trade, albeit for all those 47 years it remained a provisional agreement and organization.  
The GATT worked as a well-established supranational organization and presided over 
periods that saw some of the highest growth rates in global commerce. Since 1995, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) is—as the GATT was during its life span—the only multilateral 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
serious opposition came from the United States (US) Congress, although the US Government was one of the 
principal driving forces and was trying to champion the cause of free trade.  
4 Tariff binding implies commitment not to increase a rate of duty beyond an agreed level. Once the rate of duty 
is bound, it may not be raised without compensating the affected trade partners.  
5 See The Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, published by the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations, in 1947.   
6 As the GATT was an inter-governmental agreement, not an international organization, participants were called 
Contracting Parties or CPs. It was incorrect to call them members.  
7 At the time of its inception, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by 23 countries, 
which included 12 industrial and 11 developing economies. Subsequently three developing economies 
withdrew. As it was an inter-governmental agreement, the GATT was not a legal entity.  
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instrument dealing with the rules and regulations of international trade between nations. The 
Final Act of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) incorporated several other multilateral 
agreements on trade in goods like the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC), and the Agreement on Trade Related investment Measures 
(TRIMs) and had proposed the creation of the WTO as a fully-fledged international 
governing institution recognized in international law. In addition, the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary  Measures covered safety requirement for products 
for human or animal consumption and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
covered technical regulations, standards, testing and certification. The Agreement on the 
Implementation of the GATT 1994 Articles VI and VII covered subsidies and countervailing 
duties as well as customs valuation respectively.  
 
The most ambitious and putatively most important feature of the Uruguay Round agreement 
was the creation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It represented a 
multilateral framework of regulations for trade in services, parallel to the GATT. Although 
services sector was dominated by most matured industrial and newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs), it was not hitherto covered under the GATT. This sector covered a wide 
range of economic activities, including banking and finance, insurance, telecommunications, 
advertising, construction, transport, and computer and data processing. The office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) had presented a strong case for initiating 
negotiations on trade in services with an objective to having a “hard” agreement. This 
objective could not be achieved because it fell afoul of several domestic lobbies in the US.   
 
The European Union (EU) and Japan were in favor of a “soft” agreement covering trade in 
services and maintained constant pressure during the Uruguay Round for achieving this 
objective, while the developing countries en masse were against the formation of the GATS. 
The dominant cause of their opposition was the realization that they did not have comparative 
advantage in trade in services. As opposed to this, the industrial economies were perceived by 
the developing economies as having strong comparative advantage in this area of trade. The 
industrial economies overwhelmingly dominated global trade in services. Although not all, 
majority of the traded services tended to be technology-intensive and/or human-capital 
intensive. Therefore, dominance of industrial economies in this sector of multilateral trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 The GATT was officially terminated on 31 December 1995, although the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was born on 1 January 1995. 
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was natural. However, some developing economies did enjoy comparative advantage in 
labor-intensive services like construction, data processing and software designing. They 
could be expected to gain from trade liberalization under the aegis of the GATS.  
 
In trade economics, the two expressions, namely, the GATT-1947 and the GATT-1994, are 
frequently used. The difference between the two is that that the latter is the revised version of 
the original GATT Agreement of 1947. The text of the Agreement was significantly revised 
and amended during the Uruguay Round and the new version was agreed upon in Marrakesh, 
Morocco. Apparently, the GATT-1994 reflected the outcome of the negotiations on issues 
relating to the interpretations of specific articles. In its renewed version, the GATT-1994 
includes specific understandings with respect to GATT Articles, its obligations and 
provisions, plus the Marrakwsh Protocol of GATT-1994. Although there were numerous 
changes in the Articles of Agreement, the noteworthy ones included those in Article II 
regarding tariff schedules, in Article XVII regarding state trading enterprises, in Article 
XXIV regarding regional trade agreements, in Article XXVIII regarding modifications of 
tariff schedule, and in the area of balance of payments provisions covered by Articles XII and 
XVIII. The GATT-1994 has superseded the GATT-1947. While GATT-1994 was a natural 
progression of multilateral trade regulations, it also enabled the CPs to by pass the need to 
formally amend the original GATT-1947. By creating a GATT-1994 they agreed to create a 
Single Undertaking, applicable to all. This was a pragmatic plan. All the members of the 
WTO only had to sign the GATT-1994, in lieu of GATT-1947 together with all of its 
subsequent amendments (Milner and Read, 2002).  
 
An unprecedented 124 countries formally adopted the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994.9 As set 
out above, the most significant tangible outcome of signing the Marrakesh Agreement was 
the birth of WTO on 1 January 1995.10 Like the United Nations and the World Bank, it 
became a key institution of global governance. Its essential functions are: (i) administering 
WTO trade agreements, (ii) providing a forum for multilateral trade negotiations, 
(iii) handling trade disputes between members, (iv) monitoring national trade policies, (v) 
providing technical assistance and training for developing countries, and (vi) handling 
economic co-operation with other international organizations. These six functions have been 
                                                           
9 The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was completed in 1994. The formal agreement was 
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994, therefore it is also referred to as the Marrakesh Agreement.     
10 Refer to footnote 8 above. 
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outlines in Article III of the Marrakesh Agreement.11 They are performed by the Geneva-
based WTO Secretariat in co-operation and collaboration with the national delegations of the 
WTO member states. These states determine and make the systemic moves through their 
delegations. To this end, most member states maintain their permanent missions in Geneva. 
They are essentially responsible for determining the multilateral rules of trade in goods and 
services, the agenda for multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs), policy initiatives, decision-
making, and interpreting the WTO rules. Thus, the member states play a pivotal systemic role 
in the WTO, while the Secretariat plays the supporting role as an institutional facilitator.  
 
The WTO supervises three multilateral trading agreements, namely, the Marrakesh 
Agreement, the GATS and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Built on the foundation laid by the GATT, as an institution the WTO has wider 
responsibilities than its predecessor, which in turn had strengthened the global trading system 
considerably. As stated above, the Marrakesh Agreement brought agriculture, textiles and 
apparel and trade in services into the ambit of global trade regulations. With the help of the 
Single Undertaking, the Marrakesh Agreement locked all signatory countries into a set of 
agreements.  
 
As Sampson (2000) puts it, the WTO is a “set of agreements that create legally binding rights 
and obligations for all the member states.” These agreements are mutually negotiated and 
signed by the member countries. The schedule of tariffs and other limitations and restrictions 
on imports of goods and services attached to the respective agreements of a country create 
similar legally binding rights and obligations for the members. These schedules bind the 
degree of openness of domestic markets. The WTO is essentially a member-driven 
organization. For instance, in the Trade Policy Review Board (TPRB) members review trade 
policy of other members. They analyze, discuss, and take stock of all the recent developments 
in global trading system. Periodically, they negotiate to liberalize tariff barriers, quota 
restrictions, non-tariff and barriers (NTBs). They deliberate over the global trading rules and 
change them whenever they consider it necessary. The last-named exercise is done within the 
context of formal multilateral rounds of negotiations (Das, 2001a).  
 
                                                           
11 They are also a permanent feature of the WTO website. 
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The Articles of Agreement of the WTO, as rule, are lengthy and complex. They are 
essentially legal texts covering a wide range of trade and trade-related activities. However, 
five simple, fundamental principles run throughout these documents. They are: The global 
trading system should be without discrimination, progressively freer, predictable, 
competitive, and beneficial to less-developed countries. Non-discrimination, enshrined in 
Article I of the Articles of Agreement, is the corner stone of the global trading system. 
Member governments agree not to discriminate against the trade in goods and services of 
other members, either between supplying countries or between domestic and foreign 
suppliers of the same goods and services.12  
 
3. Trade Policy Liberalization and Globalization 
  
Over the preceding half century, since the genesis of the GATT, importance of international 
trade has increased dramatically in the global economy. It has been a significant driving force 
behind the spread of globalization among the industrial economies first, and subsequently 
among a sub-group of developing economies. Capital flows are important in their own right 
but trade in goods and services is an indispensable instrument of globalization. Being one of 
the two principal channels of economic globalization, it has contributed to enormous benefits 
that came from mutual interdependence among nations and from integration of the global 
economy.  
 
Trade liberalization has been an on-going feature of global economic activity over the past 
half century. The outward-oriented economic strategy adopted by the high-growth economies 
of East Asia first, and those of Southeast Asia after them, were noticed and admired by 
academics and policy makers in many countries. They had also seen the anemic outcome of 
inward-oriented import-substitution policies in South Asia. Consequently policy makers 
pragmatically tried to turn towards policies that involved more open trade regimes. In 1978, 
the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China) adopted the “open door” strategy (Das, 
2001b).  The Soviet Union and its East European allies were in complete disarray in the late 
1980s. By 1990, virtually all of the centrally planned economies that had ideologically 
eschewed market-based policies had either collapsed or began adopting economic reforms 
                                                           
12 For a more detailed account of the evolution of the global trading system, please refer to Hoekman and 
Kostecki (2001). 
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that brought foreign trade and investment into a prominent place in their development 
programs.  
 
Four trends can be clearly identified in the global trading system during the preceding half 
century: (i) highly uneven pace of liberalization of markets in goods and services in both 
developing and industrial economies, (ii) increasing differentiation in treatment for different 
levels of developing economies by the global trading system, (iii) a growing number of 
regional trading agreements (RTAs) among both developing and industrial economies, and 
(iv) expanding scope and strength of RTAs. Against the background of a general decline in 
direct trade restrictions, global market openness has increases markedly over this period. 
According to the statistics published by the WTO, during 52 years between 1948 and 2000, 
merchandise trade in real terms grew much more rapidly than global GDP. Merchandise trade 
increased by 6 percent annually, or 22 fold, vis-à-vis global output growth of 4 percent per 
annum, or 7 fold. Global trade growth outpaced global GDP growth by a significant margin. 
World trade grew more rapidly than world GDP in all but a few years of cyclical downturns. 
During the decade of the 1990s, trade grew much more rapidly than GDP. On an average 
growth rate of world trade was more than twice that of the GDP growth rate. Measured in 
constant (1987) dollars, the ratio of global trade in goods and services to global GDP 
increased from 8 percent in 1950 to 29.5 percent in 2000 (WTO, 2001).   
 
There were exceptions to the trade liberalization process. Many exceptions were made for 
domestic price support systems in agriculture, therefore, trade in agricultural effectively 
escaped multilateral discipline. During the 1960s and 1970s, trade in textiles and apparel was 
put under a system of quotas by the importing industrial economies. This system was called 
the multi-fiber arrangement (MFA). The MFA was clearly a discriminationatory arrangement 
and against the fundamental principle of the GATT, or Article I of the Articles of 
Agreements. In addition, a large area of global trade, namely trade in services, had eluded 
multilateral trade discipline until the creation of the General Agreement of Trade in Services 
(GATS) in 1995. This was the first step towards creating a comprehensive framework to 
regulate trade in services. 
 
During the recent period, 1994 was the watershed point for trade policy liberalization and 
globalization. The Marrakesh Agreement was signed and the 124 countries that participated 
in the Uruguay Round agreed upon the concept of a WTO. Secondly, during the same year, 
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21 members of Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, which includes several 
large trading economies including Japan and the US, signed the Bogor Agreement. Together 
the APEC group accounts for more than half of the global GDP. They gave themselves a 
target of freeing trade completely by 2010 for the industrial countries and by 2020 for the 
developing member countries. Third, launching of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) in 1994 was another significant achievement, having far-reaching ramifications for 
the Western Hemisphere. Fourth, the concept of uniting the economies of North and South 
Americas into a single free trade area (FTA) was announced at the Summit of the Americas, 
which was held in December 1994, in Miami. Many analysts took a triumphalist view of 
these developments and thought that free trade and ever-closer global economic integration 
have now become an increasingly achievable goal. The process of globalization entails 
interdependence between the decisions of policy makers. They need to think in unison and 
reinforce mutual decisions, while advancing towards the common goal. If some major global 
traders turn away from world markets, it would surely thwart those economies that would like 
to continue to be a part of the global integration process. This had happened during the 1930s 
when a downward spiral in world trade was set in motion in this manner.  
 
The discipline of economics has had an enduring debate on trade liberalization and openness. 
Adam Smith has extolled the virtues of trade liberalization, openness and competition in his 
magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations. Other than global integration, liberalizing process 
underpins growth. Essentially there are three sources of economic growth, namely, growth in 
inputs, improvement in efficiency of resource allocation, an innovation. The process of 
opening up to trade and investment contributes to each of the three sources of growth. A large 
number of scholarly studies have contrasted the growth performance of East Asia at one 
extreme and South Asian and sub-Saharan Africa at the other. The contrast was stark and 
striking. East Asian economies were not only the growth champions but they integrated with 
the global economy faster than the 24 "more-globalized" or newly globalizing economies 
(WB, 2002). Any significant degree of relaxation of trade restrictions results in gains, unless 
there are other policies thwarting their impact. Trade liberalization undertaken from a period 
of declining growth rates, or even falling real GDP growth rate, can lead to a period of 
growth above the rates previously realized (Kruger, 2000). 
 
There are important microeconomic implications of trade liberalization and relaxation of 
restrictions, which lead to spread of economic activities. Fujita et al (1999) have posited a 
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spatial theory of trade liberalization.13 According to them trade liberalization triggers a chain 
reaction that catalyzes the growth of secondary and tertiary economic activities in a city, a 
region and beyond. Consequently costs falls and output rises, attracting more firms in the 
same or related areas. A chain reaction is set in motion, with one stage of development 
reinforcing the next stage. As more firms are set up or move in, an agglomeration of 
economic activities is created. As exports rise, these agglomerations become more successful. 
Average costs for the firms in the agglomeration further decline and profits rise, providing 
further impetus to expansion. Output expands further stimulating expansion of 
agglomeration. Responding to the needs of end products producers, intermediate input 
producers and non-tradable services producers set up new businesses, giving greater impetus 
to the process of agglomeration expansion (WDR, 2000). New intermediate inputs make 
production more efficient in the agglomeration, lower the costs of production and enhance the 
profitability of the end product producers. They also raise quality standards. This cycle 
continues until it covers the region and then goes beyond. More businesses are attracted until 
the agglomeration becomes saturated or congested. The expansion cycle stops when the 
infrastructure becomes a constraint and costs begin to rise. When a successful agglomeration 
stops its growth in this manner, it provides an impetus to another one in the same region.  
 
 
 
4. Changing Trade Patterns and Growing Integration 
 
During the 1950-73 period, an unprecedented acceleration took place in global merchandise 
trade, exceeding 8 percent a year in real terms. The large beneficiaries of this trade expansion 
were the industrial economies. Six Rounds of MTN under the aegis of the GATT had 
contributed to this brisk growth.14 The next decade-and-a-half (1973-1990) saw two oil 
shocks, high inflation rates plaguing the industrial economies, and the debt crisis of 1982-84. 
Although the Tokyo Round (1873-79) of MTNs was launched and completed during this 
period, and the Uruguay Round was launched in September 1986, growth rate of world trade 
                                                           
13 Refer to Chapters 14 and 15 in particular. See also Chapter 17, which describes a "seamless world economy" 
although the real world is anything but seamless.  
14 These six Rounds of MTNs were: the first was launched in Geneva (1947), the second in Annecy (1949), the 
third in Torquay (1951), the fourth in Geneva (1956), the fifth in Geneva (1960-61) called the Dillon Round, 
and the sixth again in Geneva (1964-67) called the Kennedy Round. 
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decelerated to 4 percent per annum in real terms. During the decade of 1991-2000, it again 
recovered to 6.5 percent per annum.  
 
Prior to the 1980s, developing economies predominantly exported primary commodities, 
which exposed them to volatility in commodity prices resulting in terms-of-trade 
deteriorations. It also raised concern regarding developing a dependency on manufactured 
imports. A consequence of post-1980 liberalization endeavors was a large increase in imports 
and exports from other developing economies as well as a change in their composition in a 
dramatic manner. During the post-1980 globalization era, as noted above, exports of 
manufactures from the developing economies increased significantly. Their exports to other 
developing countries have continued to soar. Furthermore, exports of services have become 
much more important to a group of developing countries than they ever were in the past.  
 
In 1980, manufactured exports were merely 25 percent of their total exports of the developing 
economies as a group. By 1998, this proportion soared to 80 percent. The proportion of 
manufactured exports increased monotonically, without any interruptions, except for a 
transient decline in 1997. This was caused by the Asian economic and financial crisis. Two 
important characteristics of trade in manufactures are: First, the prevalence of intra-trade and, 
second, increasing trade in components. A corollary of rising trade in manufactures was a 
consistent decline in the share of agricultural products. By 1998, its proportion declined to 10 
percent of total developing country exports. High rate of capital accumulation in several high- 
and middle-income developing countries on the one hand, and technological growth and 
imports on the other, contributed to strong shift toward manufacturing activity and exports of 
manufactures. The fact that a sub-group of developing countries—like sub-Saharan Africa—
was left behind cannot be ignored. They continued to be exporters of commodities, and 
remained sensitive to fluctuations in commodity agricultural prices (WTO, 1999). 
 
Another important development was in the direction of exports. During the pre-1980 era, less 
than 17 percent of exports from developing countries were destined for the other developing 
countries15. By 1997, this proportion had reached 42 percent—a two-and-a-time increase in 
less than two decades (WB, 2001). This increase in the importance of intra-developing trade 
resulted not only from trade liberalization in the developing economies but also due to 
                                                           
15 Although there was a slow rise and in 1980, their proportion had reached 17 percent of the total developing 
country exports.  
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increase in the share of GDP of developing countries in the global economy. The rising level 
of intra-developing country trade can partly be explained by supply-side factors. Developing 
countries became more important as markets for each other’s goods and services. With 42 
percent of the developing country trade being intra-trade, the barriers that these countries face 
from each other are clearly more important than they were in the past. If globalization has to 
progress, tariff barriers against manufactures in the developing countries need to come down 
further. Hertel and Martin (2001) computed that over 70 percent of the tariff barriers faced by 
manufactured exports from developing economies are now imposed by other developing 
economies. Results of a GTAP exercise16 conducted by Anderson at el (2001) demonstrated 
that the benefits of developing countries from abolishing their own protection are fifty 
percent larger ($65.1 billion in 1995 dollar) than those obtainable from abolishing industrial 
country protection ($43.1 billion in 1995 dollar). These estimates are extremely conservative 
in that they ignore the gains from eliminating antidumping duties and other similar forms of 
protection.  
 
Although it started from a low level, trade in commercial services from developing countries 
increased substantially over the last two decades. The proportion of export of services from 
high-income developing economies in global exports of services increased by from 17 
percent to 20 percent between 1980 and 1997. For low- and middle-income developing 
economies it increased from 7 percent to 17 percent (Martin, 2001). Two important 
inferences have emerged from this new trend. First, a significant group of developing 
economies has succeeded in making a structural shift to capital- and technology-intensive 
exports by promoting capital accumulation and raising the skill level of their workforce.  
Second, the striking recent developments in the export pattern of the developing economies 
have significant ramifications. The most important one is reduction in the volatility of export 
revenues.   
 
                                                           
16 GTAP or Global Trade Analysis Project is a modeling framework which is designed to facilitate quantitative 
analysis of policy issues. Developed from the GTAP project established in 1992, it has been widely used to 
examine such issues as the impact of the Uruguay Round and future pattern of global trade. GTAP captures 
linkages within economies and among them by modeling the economic behavior and interaction of producers, 
consumers and governments. It is therefore possible to trace implications of a policy change like tariff cuts to 
other parts of the economy as well as other regions and economies in the model. Within GTAP consumers are 
assumed to maximize utility and producers to maximize profits. Markets are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive. There are constant returns to scale. Different regions and economies are linked in the model 
through trade. Some of these assumptions mean that the gains from trade liberalization will typically be 
understated. One such assumption is constant returns to scale.  
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As supply-side improvements became standard features of their economies, the developing 
economies, particularly the emerging market economies, gradually increased their exports to 
industrial economies. The GATT framework and discipline helped the NIEs and other 
emerging market economies in this endeavor. Consequently, many industrial economies in 
the EU and the US found that their merchandise imports exceeded their merchandise output 
(Das, 2001; Feenstra, 1998). This led to increased competition in merchandise product 
markets in the industrial economies. The composition of exports from the NIEs underwent a 
rapid transformation. They became exporters of engineering and medium-technology goods 
in the 1980s. India and the NIEs from Latin America fell in this category. By 1990, China 
also became a successful and large exporter of medium-technology products to the 
developing and industrial economies. The production of high-technology products like 
electronics, electrical goods and information technology (IT) related products from the NIEs 
in East and Southeast Asia increased substantially during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. 
These NIEs acquired comparative advantage and an impressive competitive edge in high-
technology products and, therefore, became competitive in several product lines in the 
industrial economy markets.  
 
Globalization was a tangible benefit of (i) liberalization and (ii) supply-side economic 
improvements for a sub-group of developing countries. Many low-income developing 
economies failed to participate in growth-inducing and potentially poverty-reducing benefits 
of trade liberalization, and also were not able to integrate with the global economy at all. 
Research into the pace of integration with the global economy came up with interesting 
results. A sample of 93 developing countries was divided into rapid, moderate and slow or 
weak integrator with the global economy. Results show that only one out of twenty-eight so-
called least developed countries in the sample fell in the rapid integrator category, while only 
seven more were moderate integrator. Thus, the majority of the poorest countries -- those 
most in need of the spur to growth that trade and global integration can provide -- were left 
behind in the race towards effective participation in the global markets. Their share in the 
global trade declined steadily, from 0.8 percent to 0.4 percent between 1980 and 1997 (WB, 
2000). This sub-group of economies is not only not globalizing but is making a retrograde 
motion. Contrary to the performance of this group, high- and middle-income developing 
economies did a laudable task of integration with the global economy  
 
5. Trade and Globalization 
 16
 
I began this paper by saying that the kaleidoscope of global trading system turned several 
times and international trade has enormously expanded over the preceding half century (see 
Section 1), which in turn contributed substantially to global integration through trade, but this 
has happened only selectively. Not all the economies participated in this process of global 
integration through trade. Immediately after the Second World War ended, industrial 
economies expanded their trade, which in turn supported their integration and globalization. 
As stated in the preceding section, they received institutional support from the GATT in this 
endeavor.  
 
Although eleven developing countries were among the 23 founding members of the GATT in 
1947, developing countries did not actively participate in GATT operations. Until the Dillon 
Round (1960-61), they remained more or less passive onlookers and accepted little role in the 
GATT Rounds of MTNs. Their participation began during the Kennedy Round (1964-67), 
with some 35 of them attending the launching meeting. However, during the proceedings of 
the NTNs they still continued to be essentially passive and aloof. In the Tokyo Round (1973-
79) a larger number of them attended the launch meeting and their participation in the 
proceedings of the MTNs took a serious, although marginal, form. This could be called the 
veritable beginning of their participation in the proceedings of the MTNs.  
 
The developing economies chose to articulate their grievance against the global trading 
system in and through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), which had no role in formulating global trade rules and policies. The UNCTAD 
was a successful mouthpiece of the developing economies. The developing economies 
emphasized the need for and demanded Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) in world 
trade, and they received it. To this end, Part IV was added to the Articles of Agreement of the 
GATT. Although a case could be made for the benefits of SDT and for trade preferences 
through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), yet as the developing economies had 
opted out of the rule making process, they could not possibly have any influence over the 
formulation of the rules of the global trading system.  
 
Reluctance, or inability, in participation in the Rounds of MTNs had its cost for the 
developing economies. They found that had painted themselves into a corner and that they 
could not prevent the industrial economies from taking trade in textiles and apparel out of the 
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GATT system. Once it was outside the GATT regulations, the industrial countries were free 
to use quotas to restrict imports of textiles and apparel into their markets. Several developing 
economies had comparative advantage in producing and exporting textiles and apparel. 
Similarly, trade in agriculture was kept out of the ambit of the GATT discipline until the 
Uruguay Round (1986-94). Being reluctant MTN participants as well as small trading 
countries in terms of volume of trade, the developing countries found that they just had to put 
up with the trade regulations that were skewed against their exportable lines of products. The 
developing economies bore a large share of responsibility for the world trading system being 
tilted against them (Srinivasan, 2002).  
 
Therefore, integration of developing economies into the global trading system was slow and 
did not really begin until the mid-1970s when a group of them emerged as competitive 
exporters in several product markets. This group comprised the newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs).17 The success of the NIEs on the trade and globalization fronts had a good 
deal of demonstration effect. Before commencing their globalization the developing 
economies had to move up the industrial curve and acquire comparative advantage first in 
labor-intensive goods and then capital- and technology-intensive products. There was a sea 
change in the attitudes in several developing countries after 1980. As set out in Section 5, 
during this period, a larger group of them succeeded in liberalizing domestically and 
integrating with the global economy. This country group began to be known as the emerging 
market economies. When economies export goods and services in which they have 
comparative advantage, they not only integrate with the global economy but also enhance 
global welfare.  
 
As alluded seen above, domestic support and subsidization of agriculture has continued to be 
high in the industrial economies. Developing economies’ response to such policies need not 
be creation of trade barriers of their own or stalling their unilateral trade liberalization moves. 
Instead they should vigorously participate in the on-going Doha Round (2001-05) of MTNs 
and hold the industrial economies to their commitments to eliminate agricultural subsidies. 
This should help those developing economies that have comparative advantage in agricultural 
and food products and are, or can become, exporters in this line of products. However, this 
situation is complicated by the fact that there is a small group of developing economies that 
                                                           
17 Namely, Korea (Republic of), Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
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have historically benefited from cheap and subsidized agricultural products. Majority of these 
economies are in sub-Saharan Africa. As the current scenario indicates, reduction in subsidies 
will take a good deal of time and efforts from the developing economies, because the 
industrial economies have taken a well-entrenched stand on this issue. But it is well worth 
their while because it will surely help them in the medium-term to enhance their exports in 
areas where they have comparative advantage and in their desire to globalize. 
 
5.1  Empirical Evidence of Globalization in Trade 
Some analysts have drawn attention to the fact that despite advances in technology and 
lowering of trade barriers, there is little empirical evidence of globalization in trade. Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2001) have referred to this as an “interesting riddle in international 
macroeconomics”. A large empirical literature in international macroeconomics that uses 
gravity model concluded that there is no evidence of contemporary wave of globalization 
leading to a decline in the cost of trade over time.18 The cost of trade was defined broadly to 
include transportation cost, communication cost, search cost, information cost, and the like. 
For analysis in the area of international trade, use of empirical gravity models has become so 
widespread that these models have earned the sobriquet of “workhorse of international trade”. 
While gravity models explain cross-country trading patterns exceedingly well, they reveal no 
evidence of globalization causing a decline in the costs of trade. Such results are odd, 
counterintuitive and highly implausible. 
 
The results of various gravity model exercises that estimated distance coefficient yielded 
stable distance coefficients over time. As noted above, this does not seem plausible because 
distance between two trading economies is taken as a proxy for all the trade related costs in 
the traditionally estimated gravity models. These costs have putatively declined to a great 
extent over the last quarter century. If the globe is shrinking because trade related costs are 
declining, this should be reflected in the results and the estimated distance coefficients should 
fall in value. Although attempts have been made to explain this oddity in results, explanations 
do not seem convincing.  
                                                           
18 The gravity model has been extensively used in empirical trade research. Its foundation lies in Newtonian 
physics. It comprises a single equation, postulating that the amount of trade between two countries depends 
positively on economic mass and negatively on resistance.  In its simple form, the gravity model relates bilateral 
trade between countries during a given time period to the economic mass of the two countries and the distance 
between them. Over time, the gravity model of trade has been elaborated to incorporate a wide variety of other 
factors. It reveals that countries that are closer to each other (less distance) and more similar in terms of 
historical and cultural factors are better integrated through trade in goods and services.  
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One explanation for stable distance coefficient is the continual transformation in the pattern 
of global trade. This includes the entry of new products in the global market place and the 
shift towards trade in differentiated products. Also, over time some previously non-traded 
goods may have become tradable because of technological advances and declining transport 
costs. It is likely that the previously non-traded goods were not captured in the gravity 
equation estimate of the first period. In addition, totally new products, which did not exist in 
the past, could be added to the list of tradables. If this is true, the estimated coefficient on 
distance could remain stable. There is also a possibility of increase in the estimated 
coefficient of distance if the trade costs of the newly entered products are higher than the 
trade costs of goods traded in the first and the second periods.   
 
Leaving the explanations aside, Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) spotted a major flaw in 
the gravity model computations. They found that most of the analyses did not comply with 
the specifications of the theoretical model. They said that most of the empirical exercises 
lacked “gravitas” and the users did not pay attention to the theoretical foundations of the 
model, hence the counterintuitive results like stability in distance coefficients were obtained. 
According to them those who used gravity model made an error in the choice of variables. 
While there are two relative costs that are important for bilateral trade, while most users of 
the gravity model pick the absolute cost for their computations.  
 
As opposed to the above results, Coe et al (2002) found clear empirical evidence of 
globalization in world trade as well as evidence of declining significance of geography. They 
used both cross-section and panel data. The evidence was found to be clearly discernible in 
the cross-section regressions done for each year from 1975 to 2000, and in panel estimates 
over the same period. Their estimates are different from what was seen in the general gravity 
model exercises because of two reasons: First, they estimated a non-linear version of the 
gravity model. Second, they used an additive error term rather than the standard log-linear 
version. They believed that the non-linear version is superior on theoretical and empirical 
grounds and explains the data better.  
 
Coe et al (2002) modified the empirical procedure because they believed that “the non-linear 
specification utilizes the information in the observations where bilateral trade is zero. The 
log-linear specification discards this information which may lead to biased or inconsistent 
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parameter estimates”. In their non-linear specification of the gravity model, coefficient 
estimates on various measures of geography clearly declined over time. Their measures of 
geography were distance, remoteness, and size. Their estimates indicated that there was a 
declining importance of geography, which in turn stood for a spurt in globalization for the 
decade of the 1990s. The diminishing importance of geography is logically consistent with 
the phenomenon of globalization. 
 
5.2.  Empirical Evidence of Globalization in Goods Market 
 
Measuring integration in goods market is a relatively easy exercise and has been attempted by 
several scholars.19 It is easy because long-term time series statistical data are readily available 
from the IMF publicatin, Direction of Trade Statistics. In this empirical exercise bilateral 
trade flows are used as an indicator of goods market integration, apparently larger flows 
implying greater market integration. In these exercises, the level of goods markets integration 
is determined in the traditional manner, using the gravity model.  
 
Parsley and Wei (2001) improved upon the gravity model analysis. In order to ascertain the 
robustness of trade-flow-based approach, it is a good idea to look at the prices of goods 
across markets. Smaller price differentials stand for greater goods market integration. Parsley 
and Wei (2001) used price dispersion to measure goods price integration. The empirical 
exercise conducted by them selected 95 tradable goods and 83 cities across the globe. The 
study was conducted for the data for the decade between 1990 and 2000. They selected 
disaggregated goods which were standardized by weight and volume. Their sample included 
goods like light bulbs, frozen chicken, toilet paper, tonic water and similar items. For 
ensuring comparability, data was compiled from the same source, the Economic Intelligence 
Unit (EIU).  
 
The next step was to compute standard deviation of the of the price differences of the selected 
goods for every pair of cities for each year. Falling values of standard deviation in this 
empirical analysis should represent greater market integration and movement towards 
globalization through trade. The final step was to use standard deviation in econometric 
                                                           
19 For instance, refer to, Engel and Rogers (2001), Rogers (2002), Hufbauer, Wada and Warren (2002).  
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analysis of the factors underlying goods market integration, including transport costs, tariffs 
and currency arrangements.      
 
Both, the price-based analysis and the trade-flow-based analysis or the gravity model 
computations, led to similar results regarding pattern and determinants of goods market 
integration and globalization. Inferences that emerged from both the approaches are 
enumerated as follows: (i) Goods market integration increased considerably over the 1990-
2000 period. Downward trends were observed in standard deviation of price differences for 
two-city pairs. (ii) Higher distance, proxied by higher transport costs, contributed to lower 
goods market integration. In the trade-flow-based gravity model analysis, bilateral distance 
always had a negative coefficient, signifying that the greater the distance between countries 
the smaller the trade between them. As opposed to this, in the price-based approach the 
distance variable consistently had a positive coefficient signifying that the price dispersion 
for identical products—which stands for lack of market integration—tends to increase with 
distance. (iii) Some regional trading arrangements (RTAs), particularly North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) and the EU, were found to have a significant effect on the goods 
market integration. (iv) Institutionalized currency arrangements like a currency union or a 
currency board increase goods market integration among the members (IMF, 2002).   
 
5.3 Regional Differences in Trade Integration 
 
While it is acknowledged that a group of developing economies has become well integrated 
into the global trading system since 1980, there is a noteworthy unevenness and disparity in 
the degree of integration.20 In order to analyze which countries or regions are well integrated 
into the global trading system and which are laggards, IMF (2002) developed a measure of 
expected trade across different regions and compared it with the actual trade volume. The 
rationale was that the difference between expected trade volume and actual trade volume 
represented a measure of artificial barriers to trade as well as institutional and policy 
environment. To establish the expected trade volume benchmark, the versatile gravity model 
was utilized.  
 
                                                           
20 This section draws on IMF (2002). For greater details on this issue readers should refer to Chapter 3 (IMF, 
2002). 
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A country or a region was considered as “undertrading” if actual bilateral trade volume, on 
average, was substantially below the level predicted by the gravity model without explicit 
policy variables. Conversely, a country or a region was considered as “overtrading” if actual 
bilateral trade volume, on average, was substantially above the level predicted by the gravity 
model without explicit policy variables. Rose (2002) posited that as the gravity model is 
based on natural causes of trade, that is, it determines the volume of trade that should take 
place without trade policy and other institutional impediments, undertrading and overtrading 
must represent above—or below—average level of impediments. This methodology captures 
the overall impact of a country’s trade policies and institutional environment. Bilateral trade 
flow data for 131 developing and industrial economies was taken by Rose (2002) for the 
1995-99 period for the analysis of undertrading and overtrading. The data source was the 
Direction of Trade Statistics published by the IMF.   
 
The upshot of this analysis was that a great deal of undertrading took place in several regions. 
This group of economies were either not integrating with the global trading system, or 
integrating in an inadequate manner. The cause was policy and institutional distortions in 
trade and macroeconomic regimes and institutional environment. Three regions demonstrated 
a large degree of undertrading, namely, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. As 
opposed to this, the degree of undertrading was small in Latin America. The sub-Saharan 
economies traded a little more than the benchmark set by the gravity model. Countries in East 
and Southeast Asia turned out to be strong traders and overtraded. They do seem to be better 
integrated with the global trading system than the other regions. Another interesting 
revelation was that undertrading was less pervasive in intra-regional trade than in extra-
regional trade. One possible reason for this conclusion was that the RTAs like MERCOSUR 
and APEC were active in various regions.  
 
Among the undertrading regions, during 1980-2000 period, some regions turned from weak 
to weaker traders. This group of economies was the non-globalizing economies. This 
observation applies to sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. However, North Africa 
turned from slight overtrading to slight undertrading region over this period. Other regions 
that improved their trade performance included East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, South 
America, and especially Caribbean and central America. The first named country group 
showed maximum gains. The most important conclusion of this exercise is that in three 
regions (namely, the Middle east, North Africa and South Asia) undertrading remained a 
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serious problem. These three country groups have not been able to remove the above-average 
level of artificial barriers to trade in their policy and institutional environment, consequently 
they have been able to manage only a weak integration with the global trading system.   
 
6. Conclusions and Summary 
 
After the end of the Second World War, interest, enthusiasm and commitment to trade 
liberalization was exceedingly high among the major trading countries of the world. Even 
before the International Trade Organization (ITO) charter was approved, 23 of the 50 
participants of the Bretton Woods conference decided, to launch negotiations with an 
objective to reduce tariffs and bind them. An attempt was made to create an ITO under the 
Havana Charter, which was negotiated in 1947. All the countries that signed the Havana 
Charter did not ratify the creation of the ITO as a supranational organization. In particular, 
the US Congress was against ratifying it. The GATT was created in lieu of the ITO, which 
worked as a well-established organization and presided over periods that saw some of the 
highest growth rates in global commerce. An unprecedented 124 countries formally adopted 
the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994. A tangible outcome of signing the Marrakesh Agreement 
was the birth of World Trade Organization (WTO) on 1 January 1995. Since 1995, the WTO 
is the only multilateral organization dealing with the rules and regulations of international 
trade between nations. The WTO is a set of agreements that create legally binding rights and 
obligations for all the member states. These agreements are mutually negotiated and signed 
by the member countries. In addition, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
was created during the Uruguay Round of the MTNs. The GATS was most ambitious and 
putatively most important feature of the Uruguay Round agreement.  
 
Since the genesis of the GATT, importance of international trade in the global economy 
increased dramatically. It has been a significant driving force behind the spread of 
globalization among the industrial economies first, and subsequently among a sub-group of 
developing economies. Trade liberalization has been an on-going feature of global economic 
activity over the past half century. The outward-oriented economic strategy adopted by the 
high-growth economies of East Asia first, and those of Southeast Asia after them, were 
noticed and admired by academics and policy makers in many countries. This strategy had a 
good deal of demonstration effect globally.  
 
 24
Since the 1980s, there has been a radical change in thinking about trade policy in the 
developing economies, particularly in the middle- and higher-income ones. In many of them, 
macroeconomic and trade policy changes are being used to address the problems related to 
current account imbalances. The change in the mindset of the policy makers was reflected in 
the wave of unilateral trade reforms that swept in the developing economies. This was the 
most profound and far reaching manifestation of their interest in participation in global trade. 
The average levels of tariffs were slashed from 30 percent in 1980 to 15 percent in the late 
1990s. To be sure, there were differences among developing economies in their commitment 
to the strategy of liberalization. The declines in tariff barriers, alluded to above, must not be 
seen in absolute terms. They need to be carefully examined for their impact because it is 
possible that declining tariffs are supplanted by NTBs. Frequency of total core NTBs was 
measured for 1989-98 period. The results show a sharp decline in NTBs, including state 
trading monopolies, in all the regions except South Asia. 
 
The change in the mindset of the policy mandarins in the developing economies was clearly 
manifested during the Uruguay Round. The developing economies turned from passive 
onlookers in the MTNs to active players. During the 1950-73 period, an unprecedented 
acceleration took place in world merchandise trade, exceeding 8 percent a year in real terms. 
The large beneficiaries of this trade expansion were the industrial economies. Six Rounds of 
MTN under the aegis of the GATT had contributed to this brisk growth. Prior to the 1980s, 
developing economies predominantly exported primary commodities. In 1980, manufactured 
exports were merely 25 percent of their total exports. By 1998, this proportion soared to 80 
percent. The proportion of manufactured exports increased monotonically, without any 
interruptions, except for a transient decline in 1997. Another important development was in 
the direction of exports. During the pre-1980 era, less than 17 percent of exports from 
developing countries were destined for the other developing countries. By 1997, this 
proportion had reached 42 percent. This increase in the importance of intra-developing trade 
resulted not only from trade liberalization in the developing economies but also due to 
increase in the share of GDP of developing countries in the global economy. Although it 
started from a low level, trade in commercial services from developing countries increased 
substantially over the last two decades. As supply-side improvements became standard 
features of their economies, the developing economies, particularly the emerging market 
economies, gradually increased their exports to industrial economies. Globalization was a 
tangible benefit of (i) liberalization and (ii) supply-side economic improvements for a sub-
 25
group of developing countries. Many low-income developing economies failed to participate 
in growth-inducing and potentially poverty-reducing benefits of trade liberalization, and also 
were not able to integrate with the global economy at all. 
 
The kaleidoscope of global trading system turned several times and international trade has 
enormously expanded over the preceding half century, which in turn contributed substantially 
to global integration through trade, albeit in a selective manner. It has been noted above that 
while eleven developing countries were among the 23 founding members of the GATT in 
1947, developing countries did not participate in GATT operations. Until the Dillon Round 
(1960-61), they remained more or less passive onlookers and accepted little role in the GATT 
Rounds of MTNs. Although their participation began during the Kennedy Round (1964-67), 
it was marginal. Instead they stressed on demanding Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT) in world trade and they received it. To this end, Part IV was added to the Articles of 
Agreement of the GATT. Trade in textiles and apparel was not covered by the GATT 
discipline. Once they were outside the GATT regulations, the industrial countries were free to 
use quotas to restrict imports of textiles and apparel into their markets. Similarly, trade in 
agriculture was kept out of the ambit of the GATT until the Uruguay Round. Therefore, 
integration of developing economies into the global trading system was slow and did not 
really begun until the mid-1970s when a group of them emerged as competitive exporters in 
several product markets.  
 
Some trade analysts have drawn attention to the “interesting riddle in international 
macroeconomics”, that is, despite advances in technology and lowering of trade barriers, 
there is little empirical evidence of globalization in trade. A large empirical literature in 
international macroeconomics that uses gravity model concluded that there is no evidence of 
contemporary wave of globalization leading to a decline in the cost of trade over time. 
However, the stable distance coefficient could be explained by continual transformation in 
the pattern of global trade. Besides, some empirical exercises found clear empirical evidence 
of globalization in world trade as well as evidence of declining significance of geography. 
Their estimates indicated that declining importance of geography, which stood for a spurt in 
globalization for the decade of the 1990s. The diminishing importance of geography is 
logically consistent with the phenomenon of globalization. Exercises that focused on the 
prices of goods across markets concluded that goods market integration increased 
considerably over the 1990-2000 period. Downward trends were observed in standard 
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deviation of price differences for two-city pairs. Also, higher distance, proxied by higher 
transport costs, contributed to lower goods market integration. It was observed that the 
greater the distance between countries the smaller the trade between them. As opposed to 
this, in the price-based approach the distance variable consistently had a positive coefficient 
signifying that the price dispersion for identical products—which stands for lack of market 
integration—tends to increase with distance.  
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